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Abstract Mutual grooming plays a central role in the establishment and maintenance
of social relationships in primates. Allogrooming has two main functions: hygiene and
bonding with partners. The duration of grooming bouts is commonly used in studies of
the functional aspects of grooming, but few reflect on the proximate mechanisms that
determine grooming bout lengths. As it is highly unlikely that groomer and groomee
prefer exactly the same bout length, we are likely to observe the result of some form of
negotiation. We currently lack information about the signals that primates employ to
inform others about their intentions and desires concerning grooming interactions.
From October 2006 until April 2007 we studied three behaviors shown in grooming
interactions that could potentially have a signaling function in the negotiation process
over the initiation and length of grooming bouts among adult females of two vervet
groups freely ranging in the Loskop Dam Nature Reserve, South Africa: approaching
another individual as far as that resulted in a grooming session, changing of the body
position by the groomed individual, and lip smacking. We found that “approach” did
not reliably predict which individual would receive grooming first, although ap-
proaching individuals groomed significantly more than those approached. Thus, in
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the context of grooming interactions, moving toward a group member may signal the
willingness to invest. Body part presentations appeared to be the main signal used to
demand a prolongation of the grooming by the partner. Finally, lip smacking was used
under potentially stressful circumstances, notably shortly before using the mouth to
groom the partner or an attempt to touch a mother’s infant. Our exploratory study
hopefully inspires colleagues to start looking at the role of communication during
cooperative interactions for a better appreciation of how animals manage cooperation
and negotiate exchange rates.
Keywords Allogrooming .Chlorocebus pygerythrus . Negotiation . Signaling .
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Introduction
Humans (Homo sapiens) often negotiate payoff distributions in cooperative interac-
tions. In economics the term “negotiation” is typically used for the phase preceding the
actual interaction of interest and is often tacitly assumed to result in binding agree-
ments. The negotiation phase is, however, of interest by itself and can be modeled using
bargaining game theory (Binmore 2010; Nash 1950; Rubinstein 1982). Nonhuman
animals cannot be assumed to be able to conclude a binding contract, but they can
potentially signal their intentions, desires, offers, etc. Thus, can such negotiation
processes perhaps lead to implicit agreements at least? For members of a perpetual
group, such as a group of primates, cooperation opportunities will frequently occur
over periods that are very long relative to the length of single interactions. According to
Binmore (2010) implicit agreements that are self-policing can be assumed if a game is
repeated and the “folk theorem” applies.
The term “negotiation” is used in the context of several studies of animal behavior,
even for organisms for which the use of cognitive mechanisms can safely be excluded
(Akçay and Roughgarden 2007; Akçay and Simms 2011), but the term obviously has
different meanings for different authors. Most empirical studies concern negotiations
over parental care within reproductive pairs or between parents and offspring: birds
(Aves: Hinde and Kilner 2007; Kosztolanyi et al. 2009; Lendvai et al. 2009; Lessells
and McNamara 2012; Meade et al. 2011); beetles (Coleoptera: Smiseth et al. 2006).
Other examples include vigilance and nest defense behavior (Bell et al. 2010; Sirot
2012; Trnka and Grim 2013) and experimentally induced negotiation among chimpan-
zees (Pan troglodytes) in a cooperation experiment (Melis et al. 2009). There have also
been suggestions that hermit crabs (Paguroidea) negotiate over the exchange of shells
when both indviduals can benefit from an improved fit (Hazlett 1978, 1996), but Doake
and Elwood (2011) showed that it is not necessary to invoke negotiation processes to
explain these exchanges. We here use the term negotiation for the exchange of signals
in the context of cooperative interactions that by themselves are neither costly nor
beneficial for the receiver, but potentially change the behavior of the receiver in favor
of the sender.
Where the honesty of signals is of interest, cooperation theory can borrow from
theoretical developments concerning mate choice, begging behavior, and agonistic
conflict, a body of theory largely based on the handicap principle (Fraser 2013;
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Grafen 1990a,b; Roberts 1998; Zahavi 1975, 1977a, 1977b, 1995). However, signals
can also be used to solve coordination problems, which are often inherent to cooper-
ation, and largely reduce the conflict of interest between sender and receiver. Signals
used for coordination have been studied extensively in sibling negotiations over access
to food brought by parents in birds (Bulmer et al. 2008; Dreiss et al. 2010; Johnstone
and Roulin 2003; Roulin et al. 2000), but rarely in other contexts. The honesty of
signals is not an issue in pure coordination problems without any potential conflict
between the partners.
The question of negotiation over grooming is complicated by the fact that grooming
is not only exchanged against grooming. The emancipation from its hygienic function
set the stage for grooming becoming a general currency that could be exchanged for a
number of other favors as well. Seyfarth (1977) predicted that subordinate females
exchange grooming for coalitionary support as well as for tolerance around food
resources from high-ranking females. The emphasis was shifted from rank effects to
more general trading rules with the introduction of the biological market paradigm
(Noë and Hammerstein 1994, 1995; Noë et al. 1991). Biological market theory (BMT)
explicitly views cooperation between unrelated individuals as a trade of goods and
services, whose exchange rates fluctuate as a result of changes in supply and demand, a
process that is essentially driven by partner choice. Individuals that can offer goods or
services in high demand may use their privileged position to alter the exchange rate in
their favor. The predictions of BMT conform with Seyfarth (1977) in that dominants
should receive more grooming than they give because they have the highest resource
holding potential with respect to other goods/commodities such as access to food or
fighting ability [see Henzi et al. (2003) for a detailed comparison of Seyfarth’s model
with BMT]. In the more general terms of BMT: the quantity of grooming exchanged
between two individuals will depend on their leverage (Lewis 2002) or “power” in
economic jargon. The leverage of an individual will depend on its rank, but also on the
supply and demand ratio of grooming as well as of commodities exchanged against
grooming at the moment the interaction takes place. Many studies of grooming patterns
in nonhuman primates have found such effects on grooming patterns (Barelli et al.
2011; Barrett et al. 1999; Chancellor and Isbell 2009; Fruteau et al. 2011a; Ginther and
Snowdon 2009; Gumert 2007b; Lazaro-Perea et al. 2004; Löttker et al. 2007; Norscia
et al. 2009; Payne et al. 2003; Port et al. 2009; Slater et al. 2007; Tiddi et al. 2010; Wei
et al. 2012; Xia et al. 2012, 2013). Awell-studied example is the exchange of grooming
for permission to handle a mother’s infant. This “baby market” was first described for
baboons (Papio ursinus) by Henzi and Barrett (2002) and since reported for several
other species: spider monkeys (Ateles: Slater et al. 2007), long-tailed macaques
(Macaca fascicularis: Gumert 2007a), sooty mangabeys (Cercocebus atys) and vervets
(Chlorocebus pygerythrus: Fruteau et al. 2011b), cf. Frank and Silk (2009) and Tiddi
et al. (2010).
Grooming exchanges can be described as bargaining games (Binmore 2010; Nash
1950; Rubinstein 1982) between two players, but when they take place on “grooming
markets” as described earlier, all group members have multiple outside options, which
complicates the game considerably. A detailed game theoretical analysis of bargaining
about grooming remains therefore outside our reach. Both beginning and ending
grooming requires some coordination. This can be very basic when a given pair of
animals has a fixed routine that remains stable over time. However, more than simple
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coordination can be expected when the initiative and the length of grooming are
dependent on the market situation. Each individual has to find out the momentary
value of its grooming relative to that of the partner by trial and error. We therefore
expect negotiation to take place before and during each grooming session, as partici-
pants are testing the water and try changing investments and returns to their advantage.
Based on numerous studies cited above, we assume the existence of a “grooming
market” and therefore analyze our data and present our results in this context. We
concentrated on behaviors that can potentially be used to signal: 1) the desire to start a
grooming session (irrespective of the direction of grooming), 2) the desire to receive
grooming, 3) the offer to start grooming, and 4) the desire to continue an ongoing
grooming bout. In addition we looked for 5) possible signals that indicate that an
individual has no aggressive intentions. Given that partners have to be at close range,
repeated signals that reduce tension might be necessary in the absence of binding
contracts.
We investigate the scope for negotiation in grooming exchanges in wild vervets
(Chlorocebus pygerythrus). Allogrooming, or social grooming, is the most common
form of affiliative behavior in nonhuman primates (Dunbar 1991; Leinfelder et al.
2001). The primary function of grooming was probably hygienic, notably the removal
of ecto-parasites, and improving thermoregulation by improving the fur’s loftiness
(Johnson et al. 2004; Saunders and Hausfater 1988; Tanaka and Takefushi 1993).
Proximate mechanisms evolved that make being groomed feel pleasant to ensure that
individuals actively seek being groomed (Dunbar 2010; Keverne 1989). Probably
because of this hedonistic aspect, grooming became “emancipated” from its purely
hygienic function and obtained a social function as a means to establish and maintain
good relationships between group members (Dunbar 2010; Dunbar and Sharman 1984;
Sade 1972). We may assume that the length of an undisturbed grooming bout is often
determined by a negotiation process, but we know very little about the behavior used in
such negotiation processes. This gap in our knowledge is not restricted to grooming
interactions but applies to cooperation in animals in which goods or services of variable
value are exchanged in general. Most evolutionary cooperation models either assume
that communication between partners is not an option or ignore its potential impor-
tance, an often unrealistic assumption (Noë 2006); cf. Bell et al. (2010), McNamara
et al. (1999), Patricelli et al. (2011), and Sirot (2012) for notable exceptions.
We observed grooming interactions that we defined as “grooming bout” (uninter-
rupted grooming in one direction) and grooming session (multiple bouts interrupted by
breaks of ≥5s). We analyzed three behavioral elements shown during grooming
interactions by vervets that we identified in a preliminary study (van de Waal 2006)
as candidates for signals used in negotiation: approaching a group member, soliciting
the grooming of another body part by changing position while being groomed, and lip
smacking while grooming. We asked the following questions: 1) Does an approach
signal the intention to groom or the desire to be groomed? This was split into two sub-
questions. 1a) Is the approaching individual more likely to start grooming? 1b) Does
the approaching individual give more grooming than it receives over the whole
grooming session that follows? 2) Does the presentation of body parts by the groomee
(the individual being groomed) signal a demand for a prolonged bout of grooming
received? A vervet normally reacts in one of three ways to the presentation of a body
part: groom the part presented, present a body part of its own, or end the session. If
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most individuals react by grooming the presented part, we would expect to find a
positive correlation between the number of body presentations and the duration of
grooming received. In addition, the presentation of a body part should increase the
probability that a partner that just stopped grooming will start grooming again. 3) Is lip
smacking a signal that serves to reduce potential tension between the interacting
partners? In that case, we predict high frequencies of lip smacking occurring mainly
when the groomer’s behavior is likely to cause stress in the groomee. This is potentially
the case when the groomer uses the mouth to remove items from the fur, when the
groomee holds an infant, and/or when the groomer ranks above (or “is dominant to”)
the groomee.
Materials and Methods
Study Species and Site
Vervets (Chlorocebus spp.) are found in most of sub-Saharan Africa. They live in stable
social groups with linear hierarchies and female philopatry (Dunbar and Thelma 2001).
The animals we studied belong to the southern African species Chlorocebus
pygerythrus, sometimes also referred to as a sub-species: C. aethiops pygerythrus.
We conducted the study from October 2006 until April 2007 at the Applied
Behavioural Ecology and Ecosystem Research Unit (ABEERU) research site of
University of South Africa (UNISA) in the Loskop Dam Nature Reserve,
Mpumalanga Province, South Africa. Two groups of free-ranging vervets, named
Picnic group and Donga group, had been habituated to the presence of human
observers before the start of the study. The Donga group consisted of 10 individ-
uals: three adult males, six adult females, and one juvenile female. During the
present study five females gave birth. The Picnic group consisted of 11 individuals:
two adult males, three adult females, one juvenile male, and five juvenile females.
During the present study all three females gave birth and one male joined the group.
Thus, over a short period we observed grooming sessions in which one female
carried a newborn and the other did not. We excluded these sessions from the
analysis of “approaches,” because grooming in order to gain access to infants can
have a strong influence on grooming patterns (Fruteau et al. 2011b; Gumert 2007a;
Henzi and Barrett 2002). We analyzed the behavioral elements “body presentation”
and “lip smacking” in the context of all grooming sessions among adult females, but
we noted whether the signaler continued with the grooming session or paid atten-
tion to her partner’s infant.
We could identify all individuals by external morphological features. The first letter
of each individual’s code represents the group: D=Donga, P=Picnic and the number
indicates the rank (highest rank is 1).
Data Collection
We followed the monkeys for 1–10 h/d during 110 d. Two observers recorded
allogrooming interactions and agonistic conflicts on an ad libitum basis on hand-held
computers (Palm Zire 31 running PenDragon 4.0). Our grooming sessions consisted of
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grooming bouts: a new grooming bout started whenever an individual changed roles
(from groomer to groomee or vice versa) and it was recorded as continuous unless
interrupted by another activity for >5 s even if there was no change in partners. We
recorded for each allogrooming interaction: approaches (which individual approached
the other), the number of body presentations (change of body position of the groomed
individual), and the starting and ending time of each bout, as well as the total duration
each partner spent grooming. We recorded grooming sessions on video (Panasonic NV-
GS11) to analyze the frequency of lip smacking, because counts during direct obser-
vations were not feasible. During the data collection period, experiments involving
food provisioning to one or all group members took place on 58 out of the 110
observation days (van de Waal et al. 2010). We did not distinguish between experi-
mental and nonexperimental days in our analyses.
Data Analyses
Analysis of the Link Between Approach and Grooming Investment The primary objec-
tive of this analysis on groomers was to study the effect of them approaching or having
been approached by their grooming partner. For this we calculated the relative time
invested in grooming per grooming dyad as percentage of the total grooming time by
the groomer and the groomee. Here, groomers could be either approaching or
approached individuals. For one female we were not able to collect groom data of
the condition in which she was approached and therefore this female was discarded
from the analysis. Further, we corrected the test for expected rank order differences on
grooming by adding information per grooming dyad whether groomers exchanged
grooming with a more dominant or a less dominant individual.
This data set was tested using the Mass statistical package (Venables and Ripley 2002)
in the R version 2.15. We used the groom data of the groomer vs. the groomee per
unique dyad (N = 59) and analyzed these variables using a generalized linear mixed
model (glmm) with a binomial error distribution using the function glmmPQL. Model
parameters in this function are estimated using a maximum likelihood approach. To
correct for pseudo-replication, identity of the groomer and the group were included in
the model as random terms. The full model included the factors: 1) approaching
individual (two levels: yes or no), 2) grooming a dominant (two levels: yes or no),
and 3) the rank of the individual (1 to 6). Then nonsignificant higher level interaction
terms were discarded until the model converged to significance. The final model
included the two main factors approaching individual, and grooming a dominant. In
this parametric model the assumption of normality was not violated (Shapiro–Wilk test,
P > 0.05). This model is described in the results.
Body Presentation Analyses To calculate the link between the number of body presen-
tations and the duration of grooming received per interaction for each individual in the
role of groomee we conducted a linear mixed model (lme) using the lnme package of R.
We transformed the data to meet the assumption of normal distribution. As the time
data were overdispersed to large values, we used a “cubic root” transformation of the
grooming time. After transformation, the residuals of the ANOVA were not signifi-
cantly different from the normal distribution (Shapiro-Wilk normality test,W = 0.9969,
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P = 0.40). To correct for pseudo-replication, the identity of the groomer and the group
were included in the model as random terms.
To test more specifically for a potential causal link between body presentation
and prolongation of received grooming, we identified situations in which the
groomer stopped (i.e., did not groom for >5 s) and quantified how frequently the
groomer resumed grooming (for >5 s) after the groomee changed body position as
opposed to situations in which the groomee did not change body position
(see Table I for sample size).
Lip Smacking Analyses Lip smacking data were exclusively based on video recordings
(see Table I for sample size). We analyzed the occurrence (presence/absence) and the
frequency (smacks per second) under three circumstances: 1) when an individual
groomed a partner with her hands, 2) when the groomer groomed with the mouth, 3)
when the groomer attempted to interact with the groomee’s newborn (<3 mo). Lip
smacking by the groomee was never observed. Subsequent mouth use and infant
handling attempts were considered as independent from each other if ≥5 s had elapsed
between events. To estimate the probability of lip smacking when the groomer uses her
hands (the standard form of grooming), we randomly picked the starting second of a 5-s
Table I Sample sizes per individual adult female in two groups (Donga: D1–D6; Picnic: P1–P3; numbers
from highest ranking to lowest ranking female) for five behaviors linked to social interactions: approaching,
body presentations, lip smacking occurrence, lip smacking frequency, and lip smacking frequency as a
function of recipient’s rank. (Chlorocebus pygerythrus; Loskop Dam Nature Reserve, South Africa; October
2006–April 2007).
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 P1 P2 P3
Approaching
N = interactions when approaching individual 57 85 62 46 90 74 14 14 4
N = interactions when approached individual 122 86 26 67 58 55 13 8 11
Body presentations
N = total number of grooming bouts 279 241 88 149 173 58 44 29 19
N = TOTAL number of breaks between grooming bouts 273 227 87 130 170 53 41 29 18
Lip smacking occurrence (presence/absence)
(a) When an individual groomed a partner with the hands 12 15 11 13 20 32 4 8 3
(b) When the groomer groomed with the mouth 8 20 5 3 18 17 1 11 2
(c) When the groomer attempted to interact with the groomee’s
newborn
6 7 1 1 6 5 1 4 2
Lip smacking frequency (smacks per second)
(a) When an individual groomed a partner with the hands 2 2 - 1 - 1 - 1 1
(b) When the groomer groomed with the mouth 8 14 3 3 10 13 - 6 1
(c) When the groomer attempted to interact with the groomee’s
newborn
5 2 4 1 3 1 2 4 2
Lip smacking frequency and recipient rank [data only from the (b) context]
N = number of lip smacking events analyzed for each recipient 4 15 3 11 14 4 5 1 1
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observation interval for each grooming session and noted whether or not lip smacking
occurred in that interval. If the groomer’s mouth was not visible at the start of the
picked interval, we let the video run until the next 5-s interval with the groomer’s
mouth visible to collect our data point. Sample sizes are given in Table I.
Whenever lip smacking occurred and the mouth of the subject was clearly visible,
we calculated the frequency of mouth movements. A slow motion program (Windows
Media Player) enabled us to count the number of lip smacks per second for 1)
grooming with hands, 2) grooming with mouth, 3) infant-handling attempt (Table I
for sample size).
A matched pair design allowed us to analyze whether the probability and/or the
frequency of lip smacking differed between the three situations. For the context
“grooming with mouth” we also calculated correlations between lip smacking frequen-
cy and the recipient’s rank (see Table I for sample size).
Statistics
The female rank order was determined with Matman (Matrix manipulation and anal-
yses package in The Observer, Noldus). In the following “rank” is used as shorthand
for the place of an individual in the hierarchy of adult females, whereby rank 1 is
assigned to the highest ranking female. Statistical analyses were carried out with SPSS
(version 16.0 for Windows) unless specified otherwise in the text. All the tests
performed with SPSS are nonparametric, two-tailed, and with α set at 0.05. When
several calculations were conducted to answer the same question, we lowered the
α-level using the sequential Bonferroni technique (Rice 1989).
Ethical Note
Our observations were approved by ABEERU boards of UNISA as well as Park
Boards of the Mpumalanga Province, South Africa. Our data involve only observations
in a natural context.
Results
How Does Approaching vs. Being Approached Affect Grooming Interactions?
Being the approaching or the approached individual did not significantly alter a
female’s probability to groom first (Wilcoxon signed ranks test: N = 9 dyads,
z = –0.770, P = 0.496, Fig. 1).
Individuals that started grooming groomed most (groomers vs. groomees: glmm,
t(47) = 6.51, P < 0.001), and the relative time invested in grooming was significantly
higher when the groomer was the approaching individual than when she was the
approached individual (glmm, t(47) = 2.06, P = 0.045). In addition, groomers groomed
more when interacting when the groomee was dominant over the groomer than vice
versa (effect of dominance: glmm, t(49) = 2.71, P = 0.009) (Fig. 2).
To check whether the absolute position in the female rank order might explain
additive variation in grooming investment on top of the dominance relationship of the
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grooming dyad, we added this factor to the glmm model. However, “rank position”
showed a highly significant relationship with “dominance relationship” in the glmm
model (correlation factor: R = –0.71). When the rank position was used in the final
model instead of the dominance relationship, this would result in a nonsignificant trend
of the rank position on the investment in grooming (glmm, t(6) = 2.11, P = 0.080).
Do Body Presentations Prolong an Interaction?
Controlling for individual identity, the correlation between the number of body pre-
sentations and the mean duration of the grooming bout received was significantly
positive (lme, F(1,12) = 161.6, P < 0.001, Fig. 3), without an effect of group identity
(F(1, 10) = 0.53, P = 0.48).This significant effect of grooming length increasing with an
Fig. 2 The proportion of grooming of the groomer (first to groom) relative to grooming received by the
groomee (%) vs. a female’s role as the one that approaches or that is approached, and whether a dominant or
subordinate is groomed. A more positive value means giving relatively more grooming. The figure shows
means and standard errors. (Chlorocebus pygerythrus; Loskop Dam Nature Reserve, South Africa; October
2006–April 2007).
Fig. 1 An index of how the probability to be the first grooming recipient is affected by a female’s role as the
one that approaches or that is approached. A positive index means that approach is linked to being groomed
first; a negative index means that approach is linked to grooming first. (Chlorocebus pygerythrus; Loskop
Dam Nature Reserve, South Africa; October 2006–April 2007).
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increase of body presentations could be due to the reaction of the groomer to the shifts
in body position of the groomee, but also to the larger number of different positions
taken by the groomee during interactions of longer duration. Therefore, we tested
whether a change in body position of the groomee after a groomer stopped grooming
increased the probability that the session continued. We found that the groomer
restarted with significantly higher probability if the groomee responded to the termi-
nation with the presentation of a new body part than if the groomee did not change her
body position (Wilcoxon signed rank test: N = 9 dyads, z = –2.666, P = 0.004, Fig. 4).
The Function of Lip Smacking
The likelihood that lip smacking occurred differed significantly between situations
(Friedman test: N = 9, χ2 = 16.188, P < 0.001). Post hoc multiple comparisons
Fig. 3 Average grooming duration (seconds) per number of body presentations (0–1–2–3–4and more).
Figure shows medians and interquartiles using mean values per individual. (Chlorocebus pygerythrus; Loskop
Dam Nature Reserve, South Africa; October 2006–April 2007).
Fig. 4 Probability that a groomer resumed a grooming interaction and started a new bout when the groomee
presented a new body part and when she did not present a new body part. Figure shows medians and
interquartiles using mean probabilities per individual. (Chlorocebus pygerythrus; Loskop Dam Nature Re-
serve, South Africa; October 2006–April 2007).
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revealed that its occurrence was least likely during hand grooming and highest when
one partner tried to interact with the other’s newborn during the grooming session (post
hoc comparisons with all P < 0.05, Fig. 5).
Lip-smacking individuals produced significantly more smacks per second when a
grooming partner tried to interact with a newborn than in other situations (Wilcoxon
signed ranks test: infant handling – grooming with mouth: N = 8, z = –2.521, P = 0.008,
infant handling – groomingwith hands:N = 6, z = –2.201,P= 0.031, Fig. 6). In addition,
individuals produced significantly more smacks per secondwhen they used their mouths
than when they used their hands (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, N = 6, z = –2.201,
Fig. 5 Probabilities for the occurrence of lip smacking during grooming with hands, grooming with the
mouth, and attempts to handle infants. Figure shows medians and interquartiles using mean values per
individual. (Chlorocebus pygerythrus; Loskop Dam Nature Reserve, South Africa; October 2006–April 2007).
Fig. 6 Number of lip-smacks per second produced the groomer when grooming with hands, grooming with
the mouth, or trying to handle an infant. Figure shows medians and interquartiles using mean values per
individual. (Chlorocebus pygerythrus; Loskop Dam Nature Reserve, South Africa; October 2006–April 2007).
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P = 0.031, Fig. 6). The frequency of lip smacking did not correlate in any obvious way
with the rank of the groomee as the sign of the correlation coefficients differed between
the two groups (Spearman rank correlations; Donga: rs = –0.257, N = 6, P = 0.623;
Picnic: rs = 0.500, N = 3, P = 0.667, Fig. 7).
Discussion
All three behavioral patterns we investigated, approaching, presenting body parts and
lip smacking, seem to serve as signals in negotiation processes, but with different and
complementary functions. An approach might indicate either an individual’s desire to
receive grooming or the willingness to groom. Overall, our results are more in line with
the latter hypothesis, as most grooming in the subsequent grooming session was done
by the approaching individual. This was also true when controlling for the well-
established fact that dominants receive more grooming than subordinates do
(Balasubramaniam et al. 2011; Barrett et al. 1999; Carne et al. 2011; Fruteau et al.
2011a; Nakamichi 2003; Payne et al. 2003; Port et al. 2009; Schino 2007; Seyfarth
1977; Singh et al. 2006), cf. Macdonald et al. (2013). The effect was not very strong,
however, and approaching was not a reliable indicator of who groomed first. Our
results suggest that body presentations are the key signal used when the individuals ask
for more grooming and direct the groomer to those body parts that have not yet
received its attention. The groomee can thus signal that it is not yet willing to reverse
roles on which the groomer can then either accept and groom the newly presented part
of the groomee’s body or present its own body for a bout of reversed grooming. In the
latter case the groomee can either accept and groom in turn, or end the session. Van
Fig. 7 Mean lip-smacks per second performed by groomers during grooming-with-mouth events in
relation to the recipient’s rank. (Chlorocebus pygerythrus; Loskop Dam Nature Reserve, South Africa;
October 2006–April 2007).
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Hooff (1967) suggested that the function and form of lip smacking in many nonhuman
primate species and across different contexts is either appeasement when directed to a
subordinate individual or a request for tolerance when directed to a dominant individ-
ual. Our findings are in line with these assumptions as we observed both a higher
probability of signal occurrence and a more intense signal in potentially stressful
situations. Grooming individuals notably used lip smacking during grooming bouts
in which they used their mouth for grooming and when they groomed mothers holding
small infants. Grooming with the mouth tends to bring the groomer closer to a mother’s
infant and hence there might be a causal link between our two situations. Lip smacking
may not signal an offer to groom or demanding for grooming as such, but rather
prevent an anxious groomee from breaking off the session. In addition, it may calm the
infant down. The groomer better sends an appeasing signal that soothes both the
mother’s and her infant the latter influence each other’s anxiety state, which is rather
likely to be the case. Finally, the significant results reported here for all three parameters
were obtained in spite of small sample sizes and conservative statistical tests. We could
also not control for genetic relationships, although it is likely that closely related
females hardly need to negotiate over grooming.
Which Game Do Grooming Primates Play?
Primates living in stable groups have repeated interactions with the same partners.
Thus, various mechanisms may promote stable cooperative behavior like kin selection
(Hamilton 1964a,b) and/or partner control mechanisms like partner choice in a biolog-
ical market (Bshary and Noë 2003), attitudinal reciprocity (de Waal 2000), or interde-
pendency (Raihani and Bshary 2011; Roberts 2005). Over the course of repeated
interactions, any immediate inequalities should level out due to continuous changes
in needs. Nevertheless, grooming exchanges within each dyad are unlikely to settle into
fixed values that remain stable over time, because the relative values of a unit of
grooming each member has to offer vary over time for two reasons. 1) The intrinsic
value of each partner depends on alternative commodities it may have to offer. In the
case of adult females the strongest fluctuations are probably due to changes in the
reproductive cycle: the presence of newborns (Fruteau et al. 2011b; Gumert 2007a;
Henzi and Barrett 2002; Slater et al. 2007) and willingness of males to offer grooming
in exchange for sex (Barelli et al. 2011; Gumert 2007b; Norscia et al. 2009). Further
fluctuations may be due to changes in dominance status and the resulting changes in
value of agonistic support and tolerance near resources. 2) The extrinsic value of the
grooming each individual has to offer depends on fluctuations on the grooming market.
The outside options change over the long term, notably due to changes in the
composition of the groups, changes in the dominance hierarchy and changes in
the reproductive cycle of each of the females, but also over the short term as a result
of fluctuations of the number of potential partners available for grooming in the
immediate vicinity. Grooming sessions by the same dyad may thus vary from day to
day and even from hour to hour in overall length and the degree of asymmetry
(Schino et al. 2009). Thus, negotiations during an interaction may be essential in
stabilizing cooperative long-term relationships by avoiding that individuals feel
cheated. We will therefore focus our discussion on how negotiation may affect the
outcome of single interactions.
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The question of interest here is whether and how individuals decide on the length of
grooming bouts they provide using information received shortly before and during
grooming sessions. There are some constraints on the possible length of a grooming
bout, as daytime grooming usually takes place during breaks in foraging activities, but
these breaks are in general considerably longer than the average grooming session. In
the absence of any strong external cue a stable compromise about the amount of
grooming exchanged would be hard to reach, without information exchange and
ongoing negotiation. Do our results indeed show such an information exchange and
does the whole process warrant the label “negotiation”?
An individual that approaches a group member to start a grooming session is
normally speaking likely to be more motivated to interact than the stationary individual.
Our results confirm that the approached individual indeed interprets this as a signal that
its partner is willing to accept a higher grooming given/grooming received ratio than it
would do otherwise. The grooming ratio shifts to the advantage of the approached
individual even if the approaching animal is not the first to groom. A second piece of
information available to both partners is that the dominant of a dyad on average grooms
less than the subordinate does under comparable circumstances. This asymmetry is
explained by the fact that dominants can offer alternative commodities, such as
tolerance in food patches and support in conflicts, that subordinates cannot offer
(Barrett et al. 2002; Barrett and Henzi 2006; Chancellor and Isbell 2009; Henzi et al.
2003; Newton-Fisher and Lee 2011; Port et al. 2009; Tiddi et al. 2011, 2012). We do
not have the impression that vervets can coerce subordinate into grooming them as has
been reported for Barbary macaques (Carne et al. 2011), and grooming bouts were not
continued by subordinates under any overt aggression or threat by dominants.
At the onset of a grooming session both partners therefore have some information
about the time the partner might be willing to groom, but this information is incomplete
and needs to be updated during the transaction by probing the partner’s motivation
either to change roles or to continue grooming. The only way to know whether a
partner is satisfied with the amount of grooming received is to stop grooming and see
how the other reacts. It is difficult to observe the difference between the ending of a
grooming bout by lack of motivation to continue or by a desire to obtain information
about the partner’s motivation, however. What we could observe is that a vervet
unsatisfied by the length of a grooming bout received presented another part of its
body for grooming. We did not observe alternative signals that could serve the same
function, such as vocalizations and facial expressions, neither threatening nor friendly.
Aggressive acts directly following grooming sessions were not observed either, making
the existence of “punishment” of short-changing groomers unlikely. Sessions can also
be aborted by groomees that are too anxious, however, and lip smacking seems to have
the function of reducing such anxiety.
Vervet grooming interactions are probably best viewed as a dyadic nonzero sum
game with incomplete information at the outset, and with outside options for both
players, following the classification proposed by Binmore (2010). Such a game is
perhaps best modeled as a Bayesian game in which the players arrive at a Bayesian
equilibrium (Binmore 2010), which differs from interaction to interaction depending on
the momentary motivational state of the players. Another often explored option would
be a tit-for-tat (TFT)-like strategy in which each bout is matched by a reciprocal bout of
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the same length, but such a solution would perhaps be an option for species that can
groom each other simultaneously only and thus match each other’s investment instan-
taneously. But even chimpanzees, which show such simultaneous grooming, do not use
this solution consistently and often groom unidirectionally too (Fedurek and Dunbar
2009). In species that take turns within grooming sessions rather than grooming
simultaneously, the first grooming bout of each session has the character of a “sealed
bid.” A TFT-like strategy would not solve the problem of who starts and which bout
length to start with, unless, the individuals have a fine-tuned feeling for the length of
bouts and a good memory for bouts given and received during the previous session.
Our observations rather suggest that the length of a grooming bout was contingent on
information exchanges during that bout. A series of grooming sessions of a pair of
vervets thus resembles an iterated coordination game with information exchange much
more than the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma without information exchange that has
traditionally been used as a model for this type of cooperation (Raihani and Bshary
2011; Sachs et al. 2004).
When a grooming session poses problems of coordination rather than control, the
problem of the honesty of signals becomes less acute, but does not disappear
altogether. A certain amount of conflict over the length of grooming bouts remains
and thus the potential of gaining a larger share by exaggerating the level of desire
signaled. This becomes obvious in an anecdotal manner when individuals first offer
a new body part and then start to groom their partner when the latter ignored their
request.
In conclusion, we propose that within a repeated game structure vervets arrive in
each grooming session on average at a compromise over the length of time each of
them invests without a priori binding agreements and obviously without verbal
negotiation. This should not be surprising, because any grooming session must have
some finite length and some ratio of grooming given and received. That both individ-
uals largely agree over these parameter values is suggested by the fact that aggression
during and after grooming is rare and that grooming within the same dyad is often
repeated. Such mutual consent would be hard to reach without ongoing negotiation
providing each individual with enough information to adjust its own demands to the
willingness of the partner to provide grooming. We see two main avenues for future
research. First, our exploratory study should be followed by studies that explicitly test
the generated hypotheses, notably in vervets. Second, it would be important to conduct
similar studies with other species. Such studies could both broaden the catalogue of
signals potentially used in negotiation and verify the generality of our observed
patterns. We believe that a broad comparative approach is most likely to unravel the
scope for negotiation within primate grooming markets.
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